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We study credit markets in which lenders can invest in financial expertise to re-
duce the cost of acquiring information about underlying collateral. If the pledgeability
of corporate income is low, information acquisition enhances liquidity, but lenders re-
duce expertise acquisition because of the hold-up problem. By contrast, if the pledge-
ability is high, information acquisition reduces liquidity so that lenders can extract
rents from firms by investing in financial expertise and creating fear of illiquidity. Op-
timal policy involves subsidizing investment in financial expertise when the pledge-
ability is low and taxing investment in financial expertise when the pledgeability is
high.
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1 Introduction
The financial sector plays an important role in fostering economic development, and it has
been therefore recognized that boosting the overall level of the financial sector is essential
in developing economies. However, in recent years, the financial sector in developed
economies, especially in the US, has often been criticized for engaging in rent-seeking
behavior and becoming too large.1 2 Philippon and Reshef (2012) demonstrate that in
recent decades, the US financial sector has increased information technology spending
and attracted highly talented workers compared to other sectors of the economy and that
these investments in financial expertise are strongly associated with rising remuneration
in the sector.3 Therefore, it is imperative to investigate the role of financial expertise
at different stages of financial development in order to consider desirable government
intervention in the financial sector.
In this study, we examine expertise acquisition incentives in a model of credit mar-
kets in which expertise reduces the cost of acquiring information about the quality of the
collateral. We show that equilibrium investment in expertise is inefficient but for differ-
ent reasons depending on the degree of cash flow pledgeability. On the one hand, if the
pledgeability is low, information acquisition enhances liquidity so that investing in exper-
tise is socially beneficial. However, investors do not have incentives to acquire expertise
because of a hold-up problem. On the other hand, if the pledgeability is high, information
acquisition causes illiquidity, implying that costly expertise acquisition is socially waste-
ful. However, investors acquire expertise to use it as a threat to extract rents from firms
rather than to use it for information production. Our results suggest that optimal policy
1Adair Turner, a former chairman of the UK’s Financial Services Authority, comments that: “There is
no clear evidence that the growth in the scale and complexity of the financial system in the rich developed
world over the last 20 to 30 years has driven increased growth or stability, and it is possible for financial
activity to extract rents from the real economy rather than to deliver economic value” (Turner, 2010).
2See Levine (2005) and Popov (2018) for the literature on the relationship between finance and economic
growth.
3See also Goldin and Katz (2008) for an increase in talented workers in the financial industry and Kaplan
and Rauh (2010) for their increasing representation among top income earners. For similar evidence for
some European countries, see Boustanifar et al. (2017).
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intervention in the financial sector depends on the degree of financial development: sub-
sidies on expertise acquisition in countries with a low level of financial development and
taxes on expertise acquisition in counties with a high level of financial development.
We consider an environment in which firms borrow funds from investors by offer-
ing short-term contracts to finance a project requiring a fixed investment. Because the
pledgeability of cash flow from an investment project is imperfect, as in Holmström and
Tirole (1997, 1998), a firm needs to pose an asset as collateral to make up for the lack of
pledgeability. The assets used as collateral have a heterogeneous quality, high or low,
which is unknown for investors and firms, ex ante. However, after finding a firm, each
investor can acquire information about the quality of collateral at a cost for making lend-
ing decisions—lending when the collateral is of high quality and refusing to lend when
it is of low quality. Collateral can be land or financial securities and their fundamental
values are difficult to evaluate without expert due diligence.
The important feature of our model is that before finding a firm, each investor can
acquire expertise that reduces the cost of information acquisition. Expertise acquisition
incentives depend on the pledgeability, which affects firms’ preference for information
acquisition about collateral. On the one hand, if the pledgeability is relatively low, the
average-quality collateral is insufficient to cover the lack of pledgeability and thus, no
firm obtains financing without information acquisition. This motivates firms to design fi-
nancial contracts that induce information acquisition by investors and makes their exper-
tise acquisition socially desirable. However, trading friction in financial markets creates a
hold-up problem for investors’ investments in expertise. This results in underinvestment
in expertise. On the other hand, if the pledgeability is relatively high, the average-quality
collateral allows firms to obtain funds, so that all firms can finance efficient projects by
preventing investors from acquiring information. In this case, information acquisition
reduces the possibility of funding, thereby rendering expertise acquisition socially un-
desirable. Nonetheless, investors are willing to acquire expertise to threaten firms with
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the fears of information acquisition and improve bargaining positions with firms. This
implies that overinvestment in expertise arises.
Our results suggest that the role of financial expertise changes depending on pledge-
ability and thus, policy implications should differ. In economies with low pledgeability,
the government can improve welfare by subsidizing investment in financial expertise and
encouraging investors to induce more efficient screening. In economies with high pledge-
ability, however, the government can improve welfare by taxing investment in financial
expertise and discouraging rent-seeking behavior.
Related Literature: This study is related to several strands of literature.
Our study builds on the literature on theories of collateral. The existing models of
collateral examine its impact on financial contracts in a variety of settings, for example,
in the case of adverse selection (Bester, 1985, 1987; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko
and Thakor, 1987) and moral hazard (Chan and Thakor, 1987; Boot et al., 1991; Boot and
Thakor, 1994). Recent studies (e.g., Di Maggio and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015 and Parlatore,
2019) explore models of collateralized loans that incorporate trading friction. These stud-
ies typically focus on incentive problems on the borrowers’ side, while our focus is on the
lenders’ side. A few exceptions are Rajan and Winton (1995), Manove et al. (2001), and
Inderst and Mueller (2007), who show that collateral influences project screening. Our
work, however, focuses on lenders’ incentives to screen collateral and expertise acquisi-
tion.
Our study also contributes to the growing body of literature on the compensation of
employees in the financial sector. Thanassoulis (2012), Acharya et al. (2016), and Célérier
and Vallée (2019) show that compensation growth in the financial industry is driven by
competition to attract managerial talent that will enable firms to realize high returns.
In Myerson (2012), Axelson and Bond (2015), and Biais and Landier (2020), high finan-
cial sector compensation arises from the moral hazard problem. In our study, however,
greater compensation is related to expertise in the evaluation of collateral.
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This line of work is related to the literature on the optimal level of financial expertise.4
Glode et al. (2012), Biais et al. (2015), Fishman and Parker (2015), and Bolton et al. (2016)
develop models in which there is excessive acquisition of expertise. Kurlat (2019) demon-
strates that overinvestment in expertise arises in the junk bond underwriting market. In
these studies, having more expertise means producing more information. Conversely,
our model treats expertise acquisition and information acquisition separately. This set-
ting generates novel insights about the growth of the financial sector. That is, investment
in expertise can be inefficiently high with high pledgeability but inefficiently low with
low pledgeability.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on the information sensitivity of debt.
We build on the idea that symmetric ignorance can enhance liquidity, as advocated by
Gorton and Ordoñez (2014), Dang et al. (2015), and Holmström (2015).5 When issuing
“information-insensitive debt,” in which there is no advantage from acquiring informa-
tion about the quality of underlying collateral, financial markets are free from adverse
selection and highly liquid. These papers also highlight that when the debt becomes
information-sensitive in response to a shock, private information production ensues, and
a financial crisis happens. However, we explore the relationship between the information
sensitivity of debt and expertise acquisition rather than implications for financial crises.
Outline: The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the set-
ting of the model. Section 3 analyzes two benchmark cases: in the first one, investors
cannot produce private information about the quality of underlying collateral; and in the
second, everyone knows the true quality of collateral, ex ante. These exercises allow us
to clarify the key mechanism through which information about collateral affects finan-
4Philippon (2010), Cahuc and Challe (2012), and Shakhnov (2018) analyze the optimal size of the fi-
nancial sector by focusing on the allocation of talents between the financial and nonfinancial (productive)
sectors. They show that too many agents can enter the financial sector, leading to excessively low levels of
entrepreneurship in the economy.
5The idea that information can destroy economic value goes back to Hirshleifer (1971), who shows that
public information restricts risk sharing. See also Gorton and Pennacchi (1990).
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cial contracts. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium of the model. Section 5 analyzes
efficiency. Section 6 presents our conclusions.
2 Model
In this section, we describe the setup of the model.
The economy has a single good that is used for investment and consumption. There is
a continuum of firms with unit mass and a continuum of investors with unit mass. Both
firms and investors are risk-neutral and derive utility from consumption at the end of the
period. While firms are not endowed with goods, investors are endowed with a sufficient
amount. Firms are protected by limited liability.
Each firm has a project that requires a fixed investment I > 0. It produces nothing
in the case of failure and produces returns R > 0 in the case of success. The project is
subject to moral hazard, as in Holmström and Tirole (1997, 1998). The firm can choose
whether to behave or misbehave secretly. In the case of behaving, the project succeeds
with probability p ∈ (0, 1]. In the case of misbehaving, the firm enjoys private benefit
B > 0 but must accept that the probability of success decreases by ∆p ∈ (0, p). We
assume that the if a firm behaves, project has positive net present value (NPV), whereas
if the firm misbehaves, the project has negative NPV, even with the inclusion of private
benefit.
Assumption 1 pR > I > (p − ∆p)R + B.
Each firm owns a legacy asset, which has two types of quality: good and bad. The
asset is good with probability φ ∈ [0, 1] and bad with probability 1 − φ. At the end of the
period, the owner of an asset receives C units of goods if the asset is good and nothing if
it is bad. No one knows the true quality of assets at the beginning of the period.
To run a project, firms need to rely on external financing. Each firm is randomly
matched with a single investor, and the firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the in-
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vestor. The financial contract has the following structure: (i) the investor contributes I;
(ii) when the project succeeds, the investor receives Ri and the firm receives R − Ri from
its cash flow; and (iii) when the project fails, both parties receive nothing from the invest-
ment return, and the investor seizes the collateral with probability x ∈ [0, 1].6
After receiving a financial contract from a firm but before deciding whether to accept
the contract, an investor can produce costly private information about the quality of col-
lateral that the firm pledges. By paying γ ∈ [0, γmax] units of goods, each investor knows
the true quality of collateral perfectly. The cost of information acquisition γ can be inter-
preted as an inverse measure of the investor’s financial expertise, that is, investors with
lower γ have more expertise.7 The underlying idea is that investors who have more finan-
cial expertise find it easier to gather and process information about assets. The important
feature of our model is that the level of expertise γ is an endogenous variable. Before
financial contracts are offered, each investor chooses γ, incurring a cost d(γmax − γ). We
assume the marginal cost of acquiring expertise d is sufficiently small and close to zero.
While γ is publicly observable, the acquisition of information is unobservable.
The timing of events is as follows. Each investor chooses the level of financial expertise
γ. Then, each firm is matched with a single investor and offers a financial contract (Ri, x).
After receiving the contract, the investor decides whether to acquire costly information
about the quality of the pledged collateral and then whether to accept the offered contract.
If the investor accepts the contract, the firm starts to run a project and chooses either to
behave or misbehave. If the investor rejects the contract, both the firm and the investor
keeps holding their own endowments. Finally, all outcomes are realized, outputs are
6We could consider a more general contract (T, Ri, x) that allows for flexible up-front payments from
the investor to the firm T ≥ I. However, the firm would not reap any benefits through this additional
dimension. If the information-non-acquisition constraint is binding and investors earn a positive payoff, a
higher T increases the loss of lending to a firm with bad collateral and requires a higher repayment to deter
information acquisition. This makes the IC constraint more difficult to satisfy. Otherwise, since firms that
secure financing receive the entire social surplus, a higher T does not affect their payoff, while making it
more difficult for them to raise funds. Thus, T = I is the optimal choice for the firms.
7In an alternative setup, investors with more expertise receive more accurate signals about the quality of
underlying collateral by paying a fixed cost. Although this approach makes the analysis more complicated,













shared as contracted, and consumption occurs. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the
model.
Finally, we define an equilibrium in the following way.
Definition 1 (Equilibirum) A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is given by the firms’ contracts
(Ri, x), their choice between behaving and misbehaving, investors’ expertise γ, their decisions
on information acquisition and financing, and all agents’ beliefs concerning the quality of assets,
such that the following conditions are satisfied:
• Firms’ contracts (Ri, x) and the choice between behaving and misbehaving are optimal,
where beliefs and the investors’ strategies are taken as given;
• The investors’ decisions on expertise γ, information acquisition, and financing are optimal,
where beliefs and the firms’ strategies are taken as given;
• Beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule, given equilibrium strategies, whenever possible.
3 Symmetric Ignorance versus Full Information
In this section, for the benchmark cases, we suppose that investors cannot acquire infor-
mation. Instead, we focus on two information regimes: the first is symmetric ignorance,
where no one knows the true quality of collateral; and the second is full information,
where everyone knows the quality of collateral. By comparing the two cases, we study
the key relationship between information about collateral and funding liquidity.
Let φ̃ be agents’ conjecture about the probability that collateral is good. In the case
of symmetric ignorance, the conjecture on the probability of good collateral is φ̃ = φ for
any firm. In the case of full information, φ̃ = 1 for firms with good collateral and φ̃ = 0
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p(R − Ri)− (1 − p)xφ̃C (1)
subject to
pRi + (1 − p)xφ̃C ≥ I, (2)
p(R − Ri)− (1 − p)xφ̃C ≥ 0, (3)
p(R − Ri)− (1 − p)xφ̃C ≥ (p − ∆p)(R − Ri)− (1 − p + ∆p)xφ̃C + B, (4)
0 ≤ x ≤ 1. (5)
The objective function (1) is the firm’s net expected payoff. (2) is the individual rationality
(IR) constraint for investors, which requires that investors earn non-negative payoff from
financial contracts. (3) is the IR constraint for firms. (4) is the incentive compatibility (IC)
constraint, which requires that firms prefer behaving to misbehaving. (5) is the feasibility
constraint.
A decrease in compensation for an investor Ri increases the firm’s payoff (1) and
strengthens the incentive to behave from (4). This leads the firm to decrease Ri until
the IR constraint (2) is binding. Then, (1) is rewritten as pR − I, meaning that the firm
that obtains financing receives a payoff equal to the entire social surplus. Since (3) is not
binding, any contract (Ri, x) that satisfies (2) with equality, the IC constraint (4), and the
feasibility constraint (5) is optimal. Given that a higher x relaxes (4), financing actually
occurs if










(6) means that if the sum of the expected pledgeable cash flows from the project (ρ) and
collateral value (φ̃C) exceeds the cost of investment I, the firm secures financing.
The following proposition describes the effect of information about collateral on the
investors’ financing decision.
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and investors cannot acquire private informa-
tion about the quality of collateral. Then, there are four cases:
(i) If ρ ≥ I, there exists an optimal contract in which collateral pledging is unnecessary (x =
0), so that all firms obtain financing regardless of beliefs about collateral φ̃.
(ii) If 0 < I − ρ ≤ φC, then in any optimal contract, collateral pledging is needed (x > 0).
In the case of symmetric ignorance, all firms secure financing, whereas in the case of full
information, only firms with good collateral secure financing.
(iii) If φC < I − ρ ≤ C, then in the case of symmetric ignorance, no firm secures financing,
whereas in the case of full information, only firms that pledge good collateral secure financ-
ing.
(iv) If I − ρ > C, no financing occurs, regardless of φ̃.
Proposition 1 states that the relationship between information about collateral and
the financial contract depends on a firm’s level of pledgeable cash ρ compared to the
investment I. The result is summarized in Figure 2. If the pledgeability is high enough
that investors can recoup their investment from cash flows alone (ρ ≥ I) or is low enough
that firms cannot obtain financing regardless of collateral quality (ρ < I − C), there is
no role for collateral. If the pledgeability is at the intermediate level (0 < I − ρ ≤ C),
collateral is necessary to fill the gap between the cost of financing and the pledgeable
income, and information about collateral quality matters in the financial contract.
When the shortfall I − ρ is relatively small (0 < I − ρ ≤ φC), (6) holds with φ̃ = 1
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Figure 2: Financial contract in each information regime
identified as bad are not funded, and net aggregate output results in φ(pR− I). However,
with symmetric ignorance, the economy benefits from the cross-subsidization of firms
with bad collateral by those with good collateral. Expected collateral value suffices to
make up for the lack of pledgeable cash and the economy achieves the first-best level of
net aggregate output pR − I. Thus, in the case of symmetric ignorance, financial markets
are more liquid and the net aggregate output is larger than in the case of full information.
When the shortfall I − ρ is relatively large (φC < I − ρ ≤ C), (6) holds with φ̃ =
1 but not with φ̃ = φ and 0. This implies that under symmetric ignorance, collateral
is no longer enough to cover the lack of pledgeable cash and financing does not occur.
By contrast, under full information, firms whose collateral is known to be good are still
able to cover their investment needs. Therefore, full information enhances liquidity and
increases output compared to symmetric ignorance.
In the remainder of this paper, to ensure that collateral plays a role in financial con-
tracts, we assume an intermediate level of pledgeability:
Assumption 2 0 < I − ρ ≤ C.
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4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we return to the original model, in which no one knows the true quality of
collateral at the beginning of the period, and investors can acquire expertise and private
information about collateral. First, Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 characterize the optimal
contract that deters information acquisition and the one that induces information acquisi-
tion, respectively. Then, Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 analyze the case of high pledgeability,
ρ ≥ I − φC, in which information about collateral reduces liquidity from Proposition 1.
Section 4.5 analyzes the case of low pledgeability, ρ < I − φC, in which information about
collateral enhances liquidity.
4.1 Information-insensitive contracts
Given that investors can acquire information about collateral at a cost of γ, firms opti-
mally choose between a financial contract that triggers information acquisition (referred
to as information-sensitive debt) or one that does not trigger information acquisition (re-
ferred to as information-insensitive debt). We show that when pledgeable cash is high
enough (ρ ≥ I − φC), issuing information-insensitive debt enhances liquidity, but this
may be costly to firms because they need to promise investors compensation commensu-
rate with the level of their expertise to prevent information acquisition.
First, consider firms offering an information-insensitive debt contract (RiI I , xI I). Firms
choose the contract (RiI I , xI I) to maximize
p(R − RiI I)− (1 − p)xI IφC (8)
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subject to
pRiI I + (1 − p)xI IφC ≥ I, (9)
p(R − RiI I)− (1 − p)xI IφC ≥ 0, (10)




0 ≤ xI I ≤ 1, (12)
pRiI I + (1 − p)xI IφC − I ≥ φ
[
pRiI I + (1 − p)xI IC − I
]
− γ. (13)
Similar to the optimization problem (1)-(5) with φ̃ = φ, the objective function (8) is the
firm’s net payoff, (9) is the IR constraint for investors, (10) is the IR constraint for firms,
(11) is the IC constraint, and (12) is the feasibility constraint.
The additional constraint is (13), which ensures that the investors’ payoff without in-
formation acquisition (the left-hand side) is larger than the payoff with information acqui-
sition (the right-hand side). When investors acquire information, they accept the offered
contract and provide funds if the firm has good collateral and refuse if the firm has bad
collateral from Assumption 2. The constraint (13) is rewritten as
(1 − φ)
(
I − pRiI I
)
≤ γ. (14)
The left-hand side of (14) represents the benefit of acquiring information. The investor
who encounters a firm with bad collateral with probability 1 − φ can avoid a loss of I −
pRiI I by not lending. If this benefit is smaller than the cost of acquiring information γ, the
investors choose not to acquire information.
Firms have incentives to reduce a repayment RiI I to increase their payoff. When γ
is high, we can ignore the constraint (14) so that the optimal contract problem becomes
equivalent to the benchmark problem (1)-(5) with φ̃ = φ; that is, (9) binds, and firms
receive the entire social surplus pR − I. However, when γ is low, RiI I is determined at
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which (14) binds because a lower RiI I strengthens the investors’ incentives to acquire in-
formation. This means that for investors with lower γ, firms must lower the benefit of
information production by increasing repayment RiI I and reducing the expected loss that
informed investors are able to avoid.
The mechanism through which the lower-γ investors require higher compensation
RiI I does not necessarily imply that they earn positive net payoff. If firms can decrease the
probability of losing collateral xI I until (9) binds, investors will still break even. However,
because a higher RiI I reduces firms’ stake R − R
i
I I and weakens their commitment to be-
have, firms must choose xI I to satisfy the IC constraint (11) rather than the IR constraint
(9) if γ is sufficiently low. In this case, (9) is not binding and the firm leaves rent for the
investor.8
Lemma 1 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If I − ρ ≤ φC and γ ≥ γI I ≡ (1 −
φ) [I − ρ − p min {pR − ρ, φC}], then firms can borrow funds by offering information-insensitive











pR − I if γI I ≤ γ,
pR − I −
(1 − p)(1 − φ)(I − ρ)− γ
p(1 − φ)
if γI I ≤ γ < γI I ,
(15)













0 if γI I ≤ γ,
(1 − p)(1 − φ)(I − ρ)− γ
p(1 − φ)
if γI I ≤ γ < γI I .
(16)
Otherwise, firms cannot offer information-insensitive contracts.
Proof. See Appendix A.
8See Dang (2008), who also shows that in asset markets, a party responding to a take-it-or-leave-it offer
can extract some surplus of the transaction when the offer is designed to deter information acquisition.
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Lemma 1 implies that if the level of expertise is in the intermediate range (γI I ≤ γ <
γI I), the investors earn a net positive payoff (U
i
I I > 0). As the level of expertise is higher,
investors are able to extract larger rents from firms (U
f
I I is increasing in γ and U
i
I I is de-
creasing in γ). In information-insensitive contracts, financial expertise allows investors to
improve their bargaining position with firms that have all the bargaining power by cre-
ating the fear of information acquisition. However, if the level of expertise is sufficiently
high (γ < γI I), firms do not obtain funds through information-insensitive contracts be-
cause firms lose money if they obtain financing ((10) is violated) or because they cannot
pose more collateral ((12) is violated).
4.2 Information-sensitive contracts
Then, we consider that firms optimally design the information-sensitive debt contract
(RiIS, xIS). An informed investor funds only a firm with good collateral. This implies
that once investors accept the contract, firms correctly infer that their collateral is good in












pRiIS + (1 − p)xISC − I
]
− γ ≥ 0, (18)
φ
[
p(R − RiIS)− (1 − p)xISC
]
≥ 0, (19)











The firm maximizes the net expected payoff (17), subject to the IR constraint for the in-
vestor (18), the IR constraint for the firm (19), the IC constraint (20), the feasibility con-
straint (21), and the constraint that triggers information acquisition (22).
It is straightforward to characterize the optimal contract inducing information acqui-
sition. A lower RiIS increases the firms’ profit (17) and relaxes the constraints (20) and
(22). Thus, the firms decrease RiIS until (18) binds, and they obtain the entire social sur-
plus φ(pR − I)− γ, where they have to incur the cost of information acquisition γ. This
implies that any financial contract (RiIS, xIS) that satisfies (18) with equality and the re-
maining constraints is optimal. A higher xIS and a lower R
i
IS relaxes the constraints (20)
and (22), making financing more likely. The following lemma characterizes the financing
condition in the case of information-sensitive contracts.
Lemma 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If
γ ≤ γIS ≡ φ min {(1 − p)(1 − φ)C, ρ + C − I, pR − I} ,




IS = φ(pR − I)− γ, (23)
and the investors’ net payoff, UiIS = 0. Otherwise, firms cannot offer information-sensitive con-
tracts.
Lemma 2 implies that if the level of expertise is sufficiently high (γ ≤ γIS), then firms
can offer information-sensitive contracts, and a higher level of expertise increases their
payoffs (U
f
IS is decreasing in γ). In contrast to information-insensitive contracts, financial
expertise increases the total surplus from the financial contract and investors always earn
a zero payoff. If the level of expertise is sufficiently low (γ > γIS), at least one of the


































(b) When γI I > γ
c
Figure 3: The comparison of payoffs between information-insensitive contracts and information-
sensitive contracts when γI I = (1 − φ)
[
I − (1 − p)ρ − p2R
]
and γIS = φ(pR − I)
4.3 Optimal contract in the case of high pledgeability
Based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, a firm chooses between information-insensitive and
information-sensitive contracts to maximize its payoff. As shown in Figure 3, the firm’s
payoff depends on γ. U
f
I I is nondecreasing in γ from (15), whereas U
f
IS is decreasing in γ
from (23). Thus, the firm chooses to offer information-insensitive contracts if U
f
I I ≥ U
f
IS,
that is, γ ≥ γc given by
γc ≡
1 − φ





− (1 − pφ)(pR − I)
]
, (24)
and if information-insensitive contracts are feasible, that is, γ ≥ γI I . This implies that if
γ is sufficiently high that γ ≥ max{γI I , γ
c}, firms offer information-insensitive contracts.
Whether firms with good collateral secure financing when γ < max{γI I , γ
c} depends
on the parameters. If γ ≤ γIS, firms can offer information-sensitive contracts. However,
if γ > γIS, no firm secures financing. While Figure 3a illustrates the situation in which
for all γ, either information-insensitive or information-sensitive contracts are chosen, Fig-
ure 3b shows the situation in which for some γ, financial markets collapse.
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The following proposition summarizes the result of the equilibrium contract.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that I − ρ ≤ φC.
(i) If γ ≥ max{γI I , γ
c}, firms choose information-insensitive contracts.
(ii) If γ < max{γI I , γ
c} and γ ≤ γIS, firms choose information-sensitive contracts.
(iii) Otherwise, they cannot secure financing.
4.4 Acquisition of financial expertise
Anticipating that firms offer a financial contract depending on γ, each investor chooses
γ. From Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Proposition 2, investors’ payoffs in the stage of optimal













γI I , γ
c
}
≤ γ < γI I ,
0 otherwise,
(25)
as depicted in Figure 4. If max{γI I , γ
c} ≤ γ < γI I , investors with lower γ earn higher
payoffs by using their expertise as a threat to firms that offer information-insensitive con-
tracts; otherwise, the investors must break even.
Since the cost of expertise acquisition is very small, the equilibrium level of expertise
γ∗ is determined to maximize the investor’s payoff Ui(γ). Thus, it immediately follows
that
γ∗ = max{0, γI I , γ
c}. (26)
Investors acquire expertise to the point at which additional acquisition of expertise either
stops firms from offering information-insensitive contracts. There is expertise acquisition












<latexit sha1_base64="OgeKHl8/5jLSXkDMr71quSIBa1E="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OgeKHl8/5jLSXkDMr71quSIBa1E="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OgeKHl8/5jLSXkDMr71quSIBa1E="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OgeKHl8/5jLSXkDMr71quSIBa1E="></latexit>
IS
0
Figure 4: Investors’ payoff in the case of high pledgeability
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that I − ρ ≤ φC. Then, in equi-
librium, the level of financial expertise γ∗ is given by (26) and all firms obtain financing without
inducing information acquisition.
4.5 Low pledgeability
To highlight the effect of pledgeability ρ on expertise acquisition, this section considers
the case of low pledgeability ρ < I − φC, in which information-insensitive contracts are
not feasible from Lemma 1. At the stage of optimal contracting, a firm offers information-
sensitive contracts for an investor with γ ≤ γIS and cannot obtain financing from an
investor with γ > γIS from Lemma 2. In this situation, investors with any γ have a zero
payoff, Ui(γ) = 0. As a result, expertise acquisition does not occur.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium in the case of low pledgeabil-
ity.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that I − ρ > φC. Then, the equilib-
rium level of expertise is given by γ∗ = γmax. If γmax ≤ γIS, information acquisition occurs and
only firms with good collateral obtain financing. If γmax > γIS, no firm secures financing.
The result of an absence of expertise acquisition is due to a hold-up problem. By
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investing in expertise and reducing the cost of information acquisition, investors allow
firms offering information-sensitive contracts to earn higher payoffs. Once the investment
has been sunk, however, firms with full bargaining power offer contracts that yield a
zero payoff for investors. Because the investors anticipate that they will be unable to
recoup the cost of their investments in expertise, there is no incentive to make such an
investment.
By comparing Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, we confirm that high pledgeability
is associated with a high level of compensation for investors, a high level of expertise,
no screening, and a large aggregate output. This suggests that economies with well-
developed financial markets achieve a larger financial industry and a higher level of eco-
nomic development than those with underdeveloped financial markets.
5 Efficiency
This section analyzes efficiency and discusses the role of government. Section 5.1 shows
that investors overinvest in expertise in the case of high pledgeability and underinvest in
expertise in the case of low pledgeability. Section 5.2 derives policy implications.
5.1 The socially optimal level of expertise
To highlight the inefficiencies of the expertise acquisition, we consider that a social plan-
ner chooses the financial contract and the level of expertise to maximize firms’ payoff,
subject to the same information frictions as in the equilibrium analysis. The planner can-
not observe the quality of assets, the firms’ choices between behaving and misbehaving,
or investors’ information acquisition. The key difference compared to the equilibrium
analysis is that the planner has the ability to commit to financial contracts.
When pledgeability is high enough that I − ρ ≤ φC, it is socially desirable to prevent
investors from acquiring information from Proposition 1. Thus, the planner’s problem is
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to choose (RiI I , xI I , γ) that maximizes (8), subject to the IR constraint for firms (10), the IC
constraint (11), the feasibility constraint (12), the information-non-acquisition constraint
(14), and the investors’ IR constraint,
pRiI I + (1 − p)xI IφC − I ≥ 0. (27)
(27) is different from (9) because the investment in expertise is not sunk. In this optimiza-
tion problem, an increase in γ relaxes (14) and (27), thereby increasing the firm’s payoff.
The socially optimal level of γ is given by γS = γmax. Then, since (27) becomes the same
as (9), the financial contract (RiI I , xI I) that the planner designs is the same as in the solu-
tion for the optimization problem (8)-(13) with γ = γmax. As a result, the planner facing
information friction achieves the first-best allocation.
By contrast, when pledgeability is low such that I − ρ > φC, information enhances
liquidity from Proposition 1 so that the planner’s problem is to choose (RiIS, xIS, γ) that
maximizes (17), subject to the IR constraint for the firm (19), the IC constraint (20), the fea-




pRiIS + (1 − p)xISC − I
]
− γ ≥ 0. (28)
Since (28) is binding, the firm’s payoff becomes φ(pR − I) − γ. The planner chooses γ
to maximize this payoff without taking into account the remaining constraints because a
lower γ merely relaxes (22). Thus, the socially optimal level of γ is given by γS = 0. The
planner is indifferent to any contract (RiIS, xIS) that satisfies (28) with equality and the
remaining constraints.
Proposition 5 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If I − ρ ≤ φC, the socially optimal level
of expertise satisfies γS = γmax > γ∗. If I − ρ > φC, it satisfies γS = 0 < γ∗.
Proposition 5 emphasizes the importance of commitment. When pledgeability is suf-
ficiently high, information production generates illiquidity and investment in expertise is
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merely a waste of resources. The planner with the ability to commit to financial contracts
refrains from the acquisition of expertise. Without the commitment, however, investors
are willing to acquire expertise because they can use it as a threat to improve their bar-
gaining position with firms. Thus, over-investment in expertise arises in equilibrium.
In contrast, when pledgeability is sufficiently low, information production increases
the total surplus from the financial contracts and thus, investments in expertise are value-
enhancing activities. The social planner with commitment ability can overcome the hold-
up problem, whereas investors cannot overcome this problem in equilibrium. Thus,
under-investment in expertise arises in equilibrium.
5.2 Policy implications
Proposition 5 implies that the government can improve social welfare by managing in-
vestment in financial expertise. We consider the government that uses taxes and subsi-
dies on investment in expertise. If the government with balanced budget sets a linear
tax rate τ > 0, the investor with expertise γ must pay τ(γmax − γ) and each investor
receives lump-sum transfers. If the government provides a subsidy τ < 0, the investor
with with expertise γ receives −τ(γmax − γ) financed by lump-sum taxes on investors.
From Proposition 5, the following result holds:
Proposition 6 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If I − ρ ≤ φC, the social optimum is
achieved through taxes on expertise acquisition such that τ > 1
p(1−φ)
. If I − ρ > φC, the social
optimum is achieved through subsidies on expertise acquisition such that τ < 0.
Proposition 5 suggests that policy implications will differ depending on the pledge-
ability. On the one hand, in economies with a high level of financial development, the
private marginal benefit of expertise acquisition is 1
p(1−φ)
and its social marginal benefit
is 0. This implies that the government can improve social welfare by taxing investment
in expertise and discouraging investors from investing in expertise. On the other hand,
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in economies with a low level of financial development, the private marginal benefit of
expertise acquisition is 0 and its social marginal benefit is 1. This implies that the govern-
ment can increase social welfare by subsidizing investment in expertise and encouraging
investors to invest in expertise.
6 Conclusion
This study analyzes inefficiencies in expertise acquisition in a model of credit markets in
which expertise enables the production of information about the underlying collateral at
a low cost. We show that the reasons for inefficient expertise acquisition differ depending
on the degree of pledgeability. If the pledgeability is low, information acquisition can
enhance liquidity, but investors refrain from the acquisition of expertise because of the
hold-up problem. However, if the pledgeability is high, information acquisition generates
illiquidity, which allows investors to improve their bargaining position with firms by
acquiring expertise. In equilibrium, investors acquire expertise but provide funds to firms
without producing information.
In this study, we focus on only one aspect of financial expertise, which is useful to eval-
uate assets. However, financial expertise could be essential for financial innovations, for
example, the creation of financial securities that facilitate better risk-sharing. Analyzing
the multiple roles of expertise is an important area for future research.
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. A lower RiI I increases the firm’s profit and makes (11) more likely to hold. The
firm decreases RiI I until (9) or (14) hold as equality.
First, suppose that (9) is binding. In this case, firms that secure financing obtain the
payoff U
f
I I = pR − I, so that (10) is not binding. Thus, they are indifferent to R
i
I I and xI I if
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they obtain financing. Since a lower RiI I and a higher xI I relaxes (11), the financial contract
that gives the firms the entire social surplus can be offered, as long as (i) (12) holds with








I − ρ ≤
γ
(1 − p)(1 − φ)
, (29)
(9) is binding and firms’ payoff is given by U
f
I I = pR − I.
Next, suppose that (29) does not hold, that is, γI I > γ. This implies that (14) binds
but (9) holds with strict inequality. Since RiI I is determined by (14) holding with equality,
the firm’s profit (8) becomes U
f
I I = pR − I − (1 − p)xI IφC + γ/(1 − φ). Because U
f
I I is










In this case, the firm secures financing as long as (10) and (12) are satisfied, that is, γI I ≤ γ.
Note that
γI I − γI I = p(1 − φ)
[








from Assumption 1 and the condition I − ρ ≤ φC. Finally, if γ is so small that γI I > γ,
financing does not occur.
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